For a list of publications by topic, please click on the relevant drop-down box in the “Research” tab above. For a description of my research programs, click on the main “Research” tab.

Selected Work in Progress:
(Some work is not listed in order to protect blind review)

“The Metaphysics of Epistemic Norms.”
I argue that being truth-oriented, in a way to be explained, is constitutive of a norm’s being epistemic.

The Philosophy of Money and Finance:  A Collection of Contemporary EssaysCo-edited with Joakim Sandberg (Gothenburg).
Under contract with Oxford University Press (Oxford).

“[Title suppressed for purposes of blind review.]”
Forthcoming in The Philosophy of Money and Finance: A Collection of Contemporary Essays. Under contract with Oxford University Press.

Philosophy in Banking and Finance:  Epistemic Foundations of Risk Management (working title). In progress.

List of Publications
Papers posted when permitted by the publisher. Otherwise, abstracts are posted.)

“Epistemic Norms: Truth-Conducive Enough.” Synthese, 2019.
“True Enough? Themes from Elgin,” a special issue of SyntheseDOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02242-5

“Disentangling the Epistemic Failings of the 2008 Financial Crisis.” In The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology,
D. Coady and J. Chase (eds), pp. 196-210.
Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2018.

“Socratic Metaethics Imagined.” Co-authored with Steve Ross.
S.Ph. Essays and Explanations, December 2017: 1-8.
Open-Access Link:

“Deficiency Arguments Against Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Indefeasibility.” Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1675-86, 2016.  

“Defending Moral Mind-Independence:
The Expressivist’s Precarious Turn.”
Philosophia, 42(3) 2014: 861-69.

“The Mystery of the Mirror.”
In Leonard Cohen and Philosophy: Various Positions, J. Holt, (ed.)
Ch. 9, pp. 101-112. Chicago: The Open Court Popular Culture and Philosophy Series, Vol. 84, 2014.

“Relative Uncertainty in Term Loan Projection Models:
What Lenders Could Tell Risk Managers.”
Journal of Empirical and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,
24 (4), 2012: 501-511.
Link to Journal:

“Naturalistic Epistemologies and A Priori Justification.”
In K. Talmont-Kaminski and M. Milkowski, eds.,
Topics in Philosophy, 13,
Beyond Description:
Naturalism and Normativity.
London: College Publications, 2010. Abstract:

“Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the A Priori.”
Philosophical Studies, 142 (3) 2009: 403-426       


Review of Richard Foley’s When Is True Belief Knowledge? 
Mind, 123 (491), 2014: 894-98.
Link to Mind:

Review of Albert Casullo’s Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification.
The  Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (256), 2014: 538-40.
Link to Phil. Quarterly: