“The Metaphysics of Epistemic Norms.”
I argue that being truth-oriented is, in a way to be explained, constitutive of a norm’s being epistemic. I give an account of epistemic norms of belief formation and assessment. The account allows for pluralism in the ground-level theory: we can acknowledge a plurality of norms, for example, evidentialist, reliabilist, and coherentist norms.
In progress.

“Epistemic Norms: Truth-Conducive Enough.”
Synthese, 198(3) 2021: 2721-274. Published online in May 2019.
Open access full text
Corrections to Elgin’s reply to my paper

“Socratic Metaethics Imagined.”
Co-authored with Steve Ross.
S.Ph. Essays and Explanations, December 2017, pp. 1-8.
https://repository.belmont.edu/sph/vol1/iss3/5/
Reading and Discussion Questions for use in the  classroom: https://app.box.com/s/xp0hrwwfjmc9w8jhj7tgnjxmuw0ron0w

“Defending Moral Mind-Independence: The Expressivist’s Precarious Turn.” Philosophia, 42(3) (2014): 861-869.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9515-5

Review of Richard Foley’s When Is True Belief Knowledge? 
Mind, 123 (491), 2014: 894-98.
Link to Mind:  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/491/894